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“MOSAIC THEORY” AND MEGAN’S LAWS 
 
Wayne A. Logan* 
 
 
In law as in life, a change in perspective can sometimes afford an 
opportunity to conceive of a once settled matter in a new, more 
meaningful way.  Such an opportunity is now presented by the D.C. 
Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Maynard,1which held that 
the Fourth Amendment is violated when police, acting without a search 
warrant, make prolonged use of Global Positioning System (GPS) 
technology to create a “mosaic” of information of an individual’s public 
travel by car.  The decision, authored by one of the nation’s best known 
conservative jurists, Douglas Ginsburg,2 created a circuit split that the 
Supreme Court has agreed to resolve (docketed sub nom. United States 
v. Jones).3  
 
*Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.  Thanks to 
Susan Bandes, David Logan, Dan Markel, Chris Slobogin, and Ron Wright for their helpful 
comments. 
 1 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-1259, 79 U.S.L.W. 3610 (June 27, 2011). 
 2 See 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9-12 (2010 ed.) (noting Judge Ginsburg’s 
appointment to D.C. Circuit by President Reagan and unsuccessful nomination to Supreme Court 
by President Bush (I)).  The other two panel members, Judges David Tatel and Thomas Griffith 
were nominated by Presidents Clinton and Bush (II).  Id. at 12-14 (Griffith); id. at 19-22 (Tatel).  
For evidence that Judge Ginsburg is not alone among judicial conservatives in his privacy 
concern over prolonged GPS monitoring in public spaces see, e.g., United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (noting that “there’s no hiding from the all-seeing network of GPS satellites 
that hover overhead, which never sleep, never blink, never get confused and never lose 
attention.”). 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding no 
violation, over extended dissent of Judge Wood); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (finding no violation); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(finding no violation); United States v. Narrl, No. 2:09–992, 2011 WL 1597662 (D. S.C. Apr. 27, 
2011) (same but offering that “[m]uch of the reasoning in Maynard is attractive.”). In addition, 
several state courts have deemed prolonged warrantless GPS surveillance as searches violative of 
their state constitutions. See Comm. v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 2009); People v. 
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Holden, No. 1002012520, 2010 WL 5140744 
(Del. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 2010).  In its certiorari grant, the Court agreed to answer whether 
warrantless use of the GPS device constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and 
directed the parties to also address whether installation of the device on Jones’s vehicle violated 
the Fourth Amendment.  See United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, 79 U.S.L.W. 3610 (June 27, 
2011). 
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Time will tell whether Maynard’s view of the transformative effect 
of technology, as a collector and aggregator of publicly available facts, 
will be a watershed event akin to Katz v. United States,4 which 
emancipated Fourth Amendment doctrine from physical entry and 
property interests.  It certainly has the potential to do so.5  
Meanwhile, the approach in Maynard affords a new way to assess 
the constitutionality of yet another government data collection and 
aggregation enterprise—registration and community notification 
(RCN), commonly known as Megan’s Laws.6  In effect nationwide 
since the late 1990s, RCN requires that ex-offenders, typically 
convicted of a sex offense, provide government authorities with 
information regarding where they live, attend school and work; any 
vehicle(s) they drive; their physical characteristics (such as birthmarks 
and tattoos); facial photos; and criminal histories.  The information, 
which must be verified at specified intervals, and updated in the event 
of any changes, for a minimum period of ten years and often for 
registrants’ lifetimes, is then disseminated world-wide (via the Internet) 
in the name of promoting public safety.7 
Registry information, like the travel in Maynard, is of course 
“public” in a most basic sense. Yet it is also the case that—without 
government enterprise—the individual data bits collected in both 
contexts would be beyond the practical reach of others.  Just as the 
practical limits of surveillance capacity and resources preclude police 
from continuous month-long monitoring of a suspect’s car travel, 
governments (and community members) lack the capacity to gather 
comprehensive and current identifying information on registrants.  And, 
critically important, even if such data were somehow collected, they 
would remain disaggregated and not create informational mosaics 
revealing the daily existence of targeted individuals. 
This Essay applies the crucial insight of Maynard, that aggregated 
publicly available data can raise a Fourth Amendment privacy concern, 
 
 4 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). 
 5 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Case Asks if “Big Brother” Is Spelled GPS, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2011, at A1 (calling Maynard “the most important Fourth Amendment case in a 
decade.”). 
 6 The reference stems from the July 1994 sexual assault and murder of seven-year-old Megan 
Kanka, which prompted the New Jersey Legislature to adopt by unanimous vote a registration 
and community notification law a few months later.  New Jersey’s law, while not the nation’s 
first RCN provision, served as a major social and political catalyst, and “Megan’s Laws” has 
since served as an eponymous short-hand reference for RCN laws more generally.  See WAYNE 
A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER:  REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN 
AMERICA 54-55 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009) [hereinafter LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER].    
 7 See id. at 66-81.  RCN coverage actually extends well beyond sex offenders, ranging from 
child kidnappers to public urinators, and its appeal as a low-cost community-based social control 
method (compared to prison) is evident in its continued expansion.  See id. at 73-74, 178-79; 
Erica Goode, States Seeking New Registries for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2011, at A1 
(noting extension inter alia to persons convicted of homicide and likening new laws to 
“Christmas ornaments on a tree, [added] year after year.”). 
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to the question of whether RCN implicates a protectable Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process privacy interest.8  Part I 
summarizes the facts and holding of Maynard.  Part II surveys the case 
law, dating back to the mid-late 1990s, addressing privacy challenges to 
RCN, which typically found no such interest to exist.  Part III examines 
the question anew, applying mosaic theory to conclude that RCN does 
indeed affect the privacy interests of the over 700,000 individuals it 
now targets.  
This recognition, however, constitutes only a first step in the 
analysis.  Courts would then need to address whether RCN’s negative 
effects on privacy outweigh its avowed public safety purpose.9  When 
they do so, they will need to weigh the growing body of research 
casting significant doubt on the efficacy of RCN.  Odds are, given the 
deference typically afforded exercises of state police power such as 
RCN, and the laws’ continued political popularity, such a challenge will 
ultimately fail.  Nevertheless, as discussed later, the evaluative process 
necessitated will itself have significant benefit, for the first time 
requiring government to account for the negative privacy consequences 




In Maynard, District of Columbia police suspected that Lawrence 
Maynard and co-defendant Antoine Jones were engaged in a conspiracy 
to traffic cocaine, and despite lacking a lawful search warrant,10 affixed 
a GPS tracking device to Jones’s vehicle and tracked its location  
twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days.  Police then used the 
information obtained—a pattern of visits to a known drug stash house—
to convict him of drug conspiracy charges at trial.11  The D.C. Circuit 
reversed the trial court’s denial of Jones’s motion to suppress the GPS 
evidence, concluding that the prolonged and continuous use of the 
tracking device qualified as a search, violating his reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.12 
In reaching its result, the Maynard court needed to reconcile 
accepted Fourth Amendment wisdom that no privacy expectation 
 
 8 For similar prior efforts to draw connective doctrinal lessons from distinct constitutional 
areas see, e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently; Boerne v. Flores and 
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31; Tracey Maclin, What 
Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398 
(2001). 
 9 Cf. Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 811 (1994) 
(noting parallel reasonableness inquiries in Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment). 
 10 Police obtained a warrant to install the device in the District of Columbia but actually 
installed it in Maryland after the warrant expired.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566 FN*. 
 11 Id. at 567-68. 
 12 Id. at 568. 
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attaches to anything “a person knowingly exposes to the public,”13 and 
United States v. Knotts,14 which held that implanting a beeper device in 
a container of chemicals, and tracking the container as it was 
transported in a car driven 100 miles on public roads, did not qualify as 
a search.15  Seizing on the fact that Knotts reserved judgment on 
whether “dragnet-type,” “twenty-four hour surveillance” might 
constitute a search,16 the Maynard court distinguished Knotts, noting 
that Jones was in fact subject to twenty-four hour surveillance and for 
an extended period of time (as opposed to a single discrete trip).17 
The court next considered whether the totality of Jones’s 
movements was subjectively “exposed” to the public—either actually or 
constructively—sufficient to preclude any Fourth Amendment privacy 
expectation.18  As to actual exposure, the court stated that the likelihood 
that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month” being 
actually exposed to others was “effectively nil.”19  Framing the issue in 
terms of what police “might actually do,” not what they “could have 
done,” consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. United 
States,20 the court wrote that 
[i]t is one thing for a passerby to observe or even follow 
someone during a single journey . . . . It is another thing 
entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent again the 
next day and the day after that, week in and week out, 
dogging his prey until he has identified all the places, 
people, amusements, and chores that make up that 
person’s hitherto private routine.21 
Turning to the possibility of constructive exposure, the court 
posited that “[w]hen it comes to privacy . . . the whole may be more 
revealing than the parts,”22 citing two Supreme Court cases in support.  
In the first, United States Department of Justice v. Reporters’ 
Committee for Freedom of the Press,23 arising in response to a Freedom 
of Information Act request, the Court held that a privacy right exists in a 
“rap sheet,” containing an individual’s criminal history information, 
 
 13 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 14 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 15 Id. at 281 (stating that travel on public roads itself “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who 
wanted to look” the car’s route and destination). 
 16 Id. at 283-84 (stating that “if such dragnet type law enforcement practices . . . should 
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”). 
 17 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 18 See Katz, 397 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (conceiving now-dominant two-part 
test asking whether individual exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and whether 
the expectation was objectively reasonable by societal standards). 
 19 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 20 Id. at 560 (citing United States v. Bond, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 561. 
 23 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
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date of birth, and physical description.  While the individual criminal 
event records were indeed public, individuals had a privacy interest “in 
the aggregated ‘whole’ distinct from their interest in the ‘bits of 
information’ of which it was composed.”24  The second decision, Smith 
v. Maryland,25 involved the government’s use of a pen register to collect 
numbers dialed from a criminal suspect’s phone without a warrant.  
While Smith held that doing so did not violate the suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, it implicitly 
recognized the significance of data aggregation insofar as the suspect 
dialed the numbers knowing that his phone company could and did in 
fact record all numbers accessed (as indicated on his bill), defeating any 
privacy expectation with regard to any pattern thereby created.26 
In both Reporters’ Committee and Smith, data aggregation, like the 
government’s use of mosaic theory in national security information 
cases,27 created a difference not “of degree but of kind.”28  “The whole 
of one’s movements over the course of a month is not constructively 
exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet,” the court concluded, 
“that whole reveals far more than the individual movements it 
comprises.”29  Aggregated travel data enables inferences to be drawn 
based on repetition or sequencing, potentially revealing such matters as 
whether a person “is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at 
the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical 
treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and 
not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”30 
The Maynard court then addressed the second prong of the Katz 
test—whether the prolonged use of GPS violated an objective, societal 
expectation of privacy.  Again, the court found in the affirmative, citing 
state laws prohibiting private citizens from using electronic tracking 
devices, and the resource and practical obstacles precluding police from 
actually undertaking month-long visual surveillance.  With respect to 
the latter in particular, the court observed that “[c]ontinuous human 
 
 24 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561 (quoting Reporters’ Committee, 489 U.S. at 764).  In a footnote, 
the court elaborated that 
[t]he colloquialism that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” is not 
quite correct.  “It is more accurate to say that the whole is something 
different than the sum of its parts.” Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt 
Psychology 176 (1935). That is what the Court was saying in Reporters’ 
Committee and what we mean to convey throughout this opinion. 
Id. at 561 FN*. 
 25 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 26 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43, 745). 
 27 See id. at 562 (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases 
involving national security information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of 
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’ CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 
(1985)”). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
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surveillance for a week would require all the time and expense of 
several police officers, while comparable photographic surveillance 
would require a net of video cameras so dense and so widespread as to 
catch a person’s every movement, plus the manpower to piece the 
photographs together.”31  Use of GPS technology did not face similar 
constraints; not only was installation of the device itself easy, but 
extending the period of GPS surveillance indefinitely was effectively 
cost-free.32  “For these practical reasons,” the Maynard court concluded, 
“the advent of GPS technology has occasioned a heretofore unknown 
type of intrusion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.”33 
 
II.  RCN AND PRIVACY IN THE COURTS 
 
To date, privacy-based challenges against RCN have met near-
uniform resistance from state and federal courts.  Among the most 
influential such decisions is Russell v. Gregoire,34 where the Ninth 
Circuit upheld Washington State’s RCN scheme, adopted in 1990 and 
amended at various points through 1996.  In Washington, individuals 
were required to provide authorities their name; current home address 
and place of employment; date and place of birth; crime of conviction 
and time and place of occurrence; social security number; photograph; 
and fingerprints.35  Photos, conviction histories, and approximate 
residential locations of those individuals thought to pose the greatest 
risk of recidivism were then disclosed by means of community 
notification meetings conducted by police.36 
Subsequent to registering, two convicted sex offenders sued to 
enjoin release of the information, alleging inter alia that Washington’s 
law violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right 
to privacy.  The Western District of Washington denied their request for 
injunctive relief yet stayed community notification pending appeal.37 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, stating that “any such right to 
privacy, to the extent it exists at all, would protect only personal 
information,” such as that of a medical nature.38  RCN information, the 
court wrote, was “already fully available to the public and is not 
constitutionally protected . . . with the exception of the general vicinity 
of the offender’s residence (which is published) and the offender’s 
employer (which is collected but not released to the public).  Neither of 
 
 31 Id. at 565. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 35 Id. at 1082. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 1083. 
 38 Id. at 1094 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). 
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these items are [sic] considered private.”39 
More recent challenges brought against newer laws, requiring 
disclosure of more detailed information—including specific home 
addresses (often indicated by pinpoint maps), as well as places of 
employment and vehicle descriptions—have also been unsuccessful.  
This is because, again, the individual pieces of identifying information 
are “public” in nature.40  In Doe v. Kelly, for instance, the Western 
District of Michigan summarily refused to find a privacy right sufficient 
to “prevent[] compilation and dissemination of truthful information that 
is already, albeit less conveniently, a matter of public record.”41  More 
recently, in Smith v. Doe42 the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed a similarly 
narrow understanding in its rejection of a claim that Alaska’s RCN law 
qualified as retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  According to the Court, the law merely allowed for 
“dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of 
which is already public.”43  The state’s online registry was like a “visit 
to an official archive of criminal records,” simply made “more efficient, 
cost effective, and convenient for Alaska’s citizenry” as a result of 
being on the Internet.44 
 
III.  MOSAIC THEORY AND RCN 
 
Maynard is surely susceptible to critique, for practical reasons if 
none other.  How and where, for instance, is the line to be drawn—
when is a “mosaic” created sufficient to qualify as a “search” triggering 
the Fourth Amendment?45  Nevertheless, Maynard represents an 
important departure from the cramped public/private rubric that has 
long dominated Fourth Amendment analysis, attaching significance to 
how data aggregation impacts privacy, even when the individual data 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “a state’s 
publication of truthful information that is already available to the public” does not infringe a 
privacy right); Hyatt v. Comm., 72 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Ky. 2002) (“The information is not truly 
personal data…because convicted sex offenders never had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
regard to the information that is now consolidated and posted on the sex offender registry.”). 
 41 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); see also, e.g., People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 
152, 160 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999) (registration “merely compiles truthful, public information, and the 
Notification Law makes this information more readily available.”); State v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 
342, 356 (Ohio 2000) (“Active distribution, as opposed to keeping open the doors to government 
information, is a distinction without significant meaning.  The information at issue is a public 
record, and its characteristic as such does not change depending on how the public gains access to 
it.”). 
 42 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 43 Id. at 99. 
 44 Id. at 100. 
 45 This notwithstanding the fact that arbitrarily set temporal bounds are of course not unusual 
in constitutional criminal procedure more generally.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 
1213, 1223 (2010) (designating 14 days as the point when a suspect’s prior invocation of 
Miranda counsel right lapses, allowing police to re-approach suspect). 
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bits themselves are as a technical matter publicly available. 
Like single brush strokes in a Pointillist or Impressionist painting, 
assembling publicly available data can have a transformative effect.  It 
is not the case, as dissenting members of the D.C. Circuit asserted in an 
unsuccessful effort to have Maynard reheard en banc, that “[t]he sum of 
an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”46  Rather, the data 
points, when combined and connected, undergo a transformation in 
form.  The Supreme Court spoke to this difference in Reporters’ 
Committee in 1977, rejecting a FOIA request for individuals’ rap sheet 
information.  Even though conviction “information is a matter of public 
record,” the Court held, “plainly there is a vast difference between the 
public records that might be found after a diligent search” of 
government files and the “summary located in a single clearinghouse of 
information.”47  Indeed, if the information were readily available, the 
Court reasoned, there would be no need for the rap sheet request in the 
first instance.48  
The same observations apply to RCN, which aggregates current 
home and work address information, where one attends school, and 
conviction history, perhaps available in far-flung data sources, and 
current physical trait information and photos, which would likely not be 
so readily accessible, and publicly disseminates the information.  In 
1995, the New Jersey Supreme Court embraced mosaic theory, albeit 
not in name, to find a protectable Fourteenth Amendment privacy 
interest in RCN information.  Even though registrants had no privacy 
expectation “in many of the individual pieces of information 
disclosed,”49 the court held, RCN linked “various bits of information . . . 
that otherwise might remain unconnected. . .,”50 creating a “totality of 
 
 46 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc, joined by Henderson, Brown, and Kavanaugh, J.J.). 
 47 Reporters’ Committee, 489 U.S. at 763. 
 48 Id. at 764. 
 49 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 408 (N.J. 1995). 
 50 Id. at 411.  As the court noted: 
Government dissemination of information to which the public merely has 
access through various sources eliminates the costs, in time, effort, and 
expense that members of the public would incur in assembling the 
information themselves.  Those costs, however, may severely limit the 
extent to which the information becomes a matter of public knowledge.  
[RCN] therefore exposes various bits of information that, although 
accessible to the public may remain obscure.  Indeed, …if the information 
disclosed under the Notification Law were, in fact, freely available, there 
would be no need for the law. 
Id. See also Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp. 2d 880, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“it is obvious that 
aggregated data about sex offenders—which exposes and links pieces of data and aspects of a sex 
offender’s life that otherwise would remain obscure and unconnected–is materially more 
meaningful than any individual piece of data.  Were that not so, there would be no need for 
[RCN] because an individual’s ability to scour police records and phone books would be 
sufficient to alert and protect the public.”). 
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information” raising a privacy concern.51  The lynchpin data point, the 
court reasoned, was the home address, which altered the quality of the 
data assemblage as a whole.52  Providing home addresses, in tandem 
with stigmatizing criminal history information, subjected individuals to 
“uninvited harassment”53 and ensured “that a person cannot assume 
anonymity . . . preventing a person’s criminal history from fading into 
obscurity and being wholly forgotten.”54 
In short, in both contexts government assemblage of public 
information negatively affects privacy.  With RCN, however, the 
government behavior raises even greater concern.  Whereas in Maynard 
the target of government surveillance was unaware of being monitored, 
RCN surveillance is purposefully and decidedly overt.  The government 
makes no secret of its desire to instill in registrants a sense of being 
watched.55  Individuals are required, under threat of punishment, to 
provide identifying data, verify it at specified intervals (at least 
annually), and update it in the event of any changes (e.g., a residential 
move or growth of a beard) potentially for their lifetimes.56  As a result, 
they suffer loss of a key additional trapping of privacy—the 
autonomous right to control information about oneself,57 in a context 
 
 51 Doe, 662 A.2d at 408; see also id. at 409 (“the totality of the information disclosed to the 
public…implicates a privacy interest. That the information disseminated…may be available to the 
public, in some form or other, does not mean that plaintiff has no interest in limiting its 
dissemination.”). 
 52 Id. at 409. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 411.  See also Artway v. Att’y Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 689 (D. N.J. 1995) (“[RCN] 
goes well beyond all previous provisions for public access to an individual’s criminal 
history….[R]ather than lying potentially dormant in a courthouse record room, a [registrant’s] 
former mischief…shall remain with him for life, as long as he remains a resident of New 
Jersey.”), aff’d, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1999) (“there is a distinct difference between the mere presence of such information in court 
documents and the active dissemination of such information….”). 
 55 See LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 60.  For an earlier expression of this 
desired surveillance effect, see Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances:  Police Control over 
Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 64 (1954) (citing a Philadelphia detective who 
favored the local registration law (not also entailing community notification) because it led 
registrants “to believe that they were under the surveillance of the police department. The 
registrant’s feeling of constant surveillance and obligation to notify the police of any change of 
address might impose some regimentation….”). 
 56 For extended discussion of this impact, especially relative to whether the effects of RCN 
impose “custody” sufficient to warrant federal habeas corpus protection, see Wayne A. Logan, 
Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 189-207 (2000).  See also Erin 
Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (examining array of emerging 
technologies used to exercise social control, in lieu of physical incapacitation). 
 57 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others”); Charles Fried, Privacy [A Moral Analysis], 
218, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:  AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 
1984) (terming privacy “that aspect of social order by which persons control access to 
information about themselves”). 
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that is anything but value-neutral.58  And, even more problematic, the 
compelled information is used, not to connect the dots to permit 
inferences relating to such matters as medical conditions, sexual 
preferences, or romantic activities, possibilities highlighted in 
Maynard,59 but rather to enable harassment and threats to personal well-
being,60 the kinds of harms long recognized as jeopardizing a 
protectable privacy interest.61 
Ultimately, it may be that the benefits of RCN laws are worth their 
cost to individual privacy.  Indeed, such has been the conclusion of 
several courts, including the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1995, which 
having found that RCN jeopardized privacy, nonetheless concluded that 
its important public safety purpose outweighed the privacy intrusion, 
when the law at issue “selectively disclosed” registrant data and 
“carefully calibrated . . . the need for public disclosure” in terms of 
individualized registrant risk.62  As application of mosaic theory makes 
clear, it is this second-stage question, not whether RCN intrudes on 
privacy as a threshold matter, which courts should now be addressing.63 
When they do, they might reach a result different than that earlier 
reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  While the government 
interest behind RCN—the prevention of recidivist sexual offenses—
remains compelling,64 today’s RCN laws differ significantly from those 
 
 58 As Seth Kreimer observed: “[n]o one doubts that Hester Prynne’s scarlet letter provided 
more than neutral information, or that the effort of Senator Joseph McCarthy to ‘expose’ the 
background of his political opponents was not simply public education.” Seth F. Kreimer, 
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters:  The Tension between Privacy and Disclosures in 
Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). 
 59 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 60 LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 125-29 (surveying negative effects of 
RCN on registrants); see also State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Haw. 2001) (“[P]ublic 
disclosure may encourage vigilantism and may expose the offender to possible physical 
violence.”); Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 409 (N.J. 1995) (noting risk of “uninvited harassment” 
resulting from disclosure of registrants’ home addresses). 
 61 See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1063 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding 
privacy right implicated by disclosure of police officer homes addresses that created risk to their 
personal security); cf. Thornburgh v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 766 (1986) 
(expressing concern over harassment of women seeking abortions as a result of government 
disclosure of their identities); Brown v. Socialist Workers Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 92 
(1982) (worrying about harassment of political contributors as a result of government 
disclosures); Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1065 
(9th Cir. 2002) (disallowing effort by anti-abortion activists to publish on website the names, 
addresses, photos, and vehicle descriptions of abortion providers, with indications of those 
murdered and wounded). 
 62 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411-12 (N.J. 1995); see also Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 
396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding privacy interest jeopardized but forgoing analysis based on 
government’s compelling interest in preventing sex offenses). 
 63 See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(setting forth multi-part balancing test to determine whether an individual’s privacy interest is 
outweighed by public interest in disclosure). 
 64 This notwithstanding the understanding that the prime motivation behind RCN laws--that 
persons convicted of sex offenses as a group recidivate at higher rates than other subpopulations--
lacks empiric justification. See LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 98-99 
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of the 1990s.  They assemble and disclose in blunderbuss fashion far 
more extensive and detailed identifying information for all registrants, 
not (as in the circa 1995 New Jersey law addressed) merely those 
believed to pose greatest risk,65 and, other than ineffectual warnings 
against public misuse,66 lack the kind of safeguards deemed important 
in instances of information disclosure.67  At the same time, the avowed 
public safety value of RCN has been undercut by a substantial body of 
research casting doubt on the efficacy of RCN, raising concern that it 
actually lessens public safety and creates a false sense of security that 
drains budgets and distracts from more effective possible 
interventions.68 
It may well be that the benefit of having government serve as a 
data collector, aggregator and disseminator of registrant information is 
worth the attendant cost; but, then again, it might not.69  More is 
required of courts than the reflexive acceptance they’ve shown to date.70  
Ultimately, as with identifying the bounds of protectable privacy itself, 
the balancing unavoidably entails a legal, practical, and moral 
judgment.  In an era in which fear of crime, and sexual offending in 
particular, remains high,71 and Americans like never before regard a 
criminal conviction as a perpetual badge of dishonor,72 the smart money 
should be on continued judicial validation of RCN laws.73  However, 
 
(discussing studies). The public notice goal of RCN laws has also been criticized for the equally 
false empiric premise that sex offenses most often are committed by strangers, when studies 
establish that the vast majority of offenses are committed by persons related to or otherwise know 
by victims.  Id. at 99 (same). 
 65 Itself a matter on which the Supreme Court has expressly reserved opinion.  See Conn. 
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“express[ing] no opinion as to whether 
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates principles of substantive due process” because of its breadth 
of coverage). 
 66 LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 126-27, 159. 
 67 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594, 605-06 (1977) (noting and attaching 
importance to limits government placed on public disclosure). 
 68 See LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 110-32 (surveying empirical work 
done to date); Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries:  Fear without Function?, 54 J. L. & 
ECON. 207 (2011). 
 69 See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 1999) (Fullam, J., concurring) 
(questioning whether the “theoretical and ‘feel-good’ benefits of Megan’s Laws may in the long 
run be overwhelmed by the law’s negative consequences.  Statutes enabling, perhaps even 
encouraging, vigilantism and similar harms, seem utterly at odds with constitutional values.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Doe I v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Mo. 2006) (“The safety of children is a 
legitimate state interest and the purpose of [RCN] is to ‘protect children from violence at the 
hands of sex offenders.’ [RCN] bears a rational relation to this legitimate state interest and is not 
violative of substantive due process principles.”). 
 71 See Sarah Craun & Matthew Theriot, Misperceptions of Sex Offender Perpetration, 24 J. 
OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2057, 2057-58 (2009); Americans Still Perceive Crime as on the 
Rise, Nov. 19, 2010, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/144827/Americans-Perceive-Crime-
Rise.aspx. 
 72 See LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 155-56 (tracing shift in sentiment). 
 73 See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-
Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 329 (1989) (“As 
America moves into the twenty-first century, we must determine to what extent individual 
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only by frankly and realistically acknowledging that the laws affect 
privacy will the important public policy debate be able to ensue in 
earnest. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
This Essay has applied mosaic theory, a novel Fourth Amendment 
construct with potentially important implications for government 
surveillance efforts, to the question of whether registration and 
community notification laws jeopardize a protectable Fourteenth 
Amendment privacy interest.  Even assuming the nominally public 
quality of the individual data bits assembled by RCN, such as home and 
work addresses and current physical descriptions, their aggregation and 
dissemination creates an informational mosaic of personal existence, 
which like the travel data in Maynard differs in form from what the 
Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe simplistically likened to a “visit to an 
official archive of criminal records.”74  By the same token, Maynard, 
despite its Fourth Amendment focus, highlights the crucial analytic 
importance of focusing on the actual use of assembled data, rather than 
merely asking whether particular constituent parts are public or private 
in an abstract sense, as long urged by privacy proponents.75 
Institutionally, it will ultimately fall to the courts to effectuate the 
conceptual transformation urged here.  While it has been argued that 
legislatures hold superior promise to protect privacy in the face of 
technological advances,76 little realistic hope exists for a political limit 
on RCN, given the attendant mortal political risk of appearing indulgent 
of convicted criminals (especially sex offenders).77  Whatever the result 
reached by the Court this Term in Maynard, application of mosaic 
theory highlights the very real effect that RCN has on individual 
privacy, subject to Fourteenth Amendment protection, obliging a more 
robust examination of it and other government data aggregation and 




liberties must be sacrificed for the common good.  Ideals of liberty and privacy are stretched to 
the limit as modern fears of street crime merge with ancient fears of the plague.”). 
 74 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003). 
 75 See, e.g., Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 980 (1989); Daniel Solove, The Virtues of Knowing 
Less:  Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1065 (2003). 
 76 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
801, 882-87 (2004). 
 77 See LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 6, at 165-71 (surveying reasons for the 
ongoing political impregnability of RCN laws).  Testament to this, many legislatures have seen fit 
to specify that individuals subject to RCN lack protectable privacy interests.  Id. at 270 n.87. 
